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I. INTRODUCTION
After enduring years of a distributor selling out-of-date beer and failing to meet
sales goals, Brooklyn Brewery tried to escape its distribution contract. 1 The
contract stated the popular craft brewer could terminate the contract without cause,
but the process was not so simple.2 The distributor took the brewer to court and
argued New York’s beer franchise law superseded the contract’s termination
language and prevented the brewer from leaving the contract. 3 Brooklyn Brewery
won the lawsuit, but had to pay the distributor over $300,000 to terminate the
contract.4
Craft brewers struggling to terminate beer distribution contracts is not unique
to the State of New York.5 Nationwide, distributors are consolidating and exerting
greater pressure on state legislatures to enact beer franchise laws. 6 Beer franchise
laws impose rigid, one-sided restrictions on manufacturer termination, even if a
distribution contract allows the manufacturer to terminate or the distributor refuses
to buy beer.7 The typical beer franchise law also makes any beer shipment to a
distributor a franchise agreement and limits a brewer’s ability to terminate that
agreement.8 As a result of beer franchise laws, craft brewers have difficulty
1.
See
Steve
Hindy,
Free
Craft
Beer!,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
29,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/free-craft-beer.html (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (discussing Brooklyn Brewery’s legal challenges and settlement in terminating a distribution
contract).
2.
Id.; see
generally Craft Brewer
Definition, BREWERS ASSOCIATION (2018),
https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics-and-data/craft-brewer-definition/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (defining a craft brewer as small with an annual production of under 6,000,000 barrels of
beer and independent with less than twenty-five percent of the brewery owned by a non-craft brewer alcohol
industry member).
3. Hindy, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Thom Vogelhuber, Dogfish Head v. Glunz; No Settlement in Sight, GUYS DRINKING BEER
(Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.guysdrinking beer.com/glunz-v-dogfish-head-no-settlement-in-sight (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting on a legal battle between Dogfish Head Brewing and an
Illinois distributor on contract termination rights).
6. See, e.g., Kate Bernot, Stuck in the Middle with Who?, Pt. 1 — What Reyes’ Massive California Footprint
Means
for
the
State’s
Beer
Landscape,
GOOD BEER HUNTING (Mar.
4,
2020),
https://www.goodbeerhunting.com/sightlines/3/4/what-reyes-massive-california-footprint-means-for-the-statesbeer-landscape (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting on the effects of distributor
consolidation in California and mentioning the “nationwide reality of distributor consolidation”). See generally
MARC
E.
SORINI,
BEER
FRANCHISE
LAW
SUMMARY
1–4
(2014),
available
at
https://www.brewersassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Beer-Franchise-Law-Summary.pdf (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (listing all states’ beer franchise laws).
7. See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25000.2–25000.9 (West 2020) (outlining mandatory contract
terms for distribution territory, transfer and termination, and dispute resolution); see Kate Bernot, Stuck in the
Middle with Who?, Pt. 2 — What California’s Distribution Consolidation Could Mean for Breweries, GOOD BEER
HUNTING (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.goodbeerhunting.com/sightlines/3/5/what-californias-distributionconsolidation-could-mean-for-breweries (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing how
distributors can refuse to buy beer).
8. See SORINI, supra note 6 (outlining the typical beer franchise laws, including termination limits, notice
requirements, and informal agreements); see also Craft Distribution Contracts, BEER AND LAW (May 18, 2016),
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terminating distribution contracts.9
AB 1541 would have established a more stringent beer franchise law than
current California law, limiting a brewer’s termination of distribution contracts to
“good cause.”10 This legislation would have intruded into the brewer–distributor
relationship by indefinitely binding brewers to distributors through distribution
contracts containing good cause requirements that brewers do not want. 11 Beer
franchise laws impose strict contractual terms that may unconstitutionally compel
speech and violate the freedom of contract principles that courts routinely
enforce.12 Since contracts are a form of speech, it is plausible to infer freedom of
contract principles from the First Amendment. 13 AB 1541 would have forced
contract terms that only one party wants—substituting the terms both parties freely
agreed to—in violation of the First Amendment and freedom of contract. 14
Rather than addressing disparities in beer franchise law, AB 1541 would have
locked brewers into nearly interminable contractual relationships.15 AB 1541
would have trapped brewers into distribution contracts regardless of contractual
http://www.beerandlaw.com/blog/craft-beer-distribution-contracts-myths-mistakes (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review) (“Under some states’ beer franchise laws, merely sending beer to a distributor for sale
. . . locks that brewery into the distributor without an ability to terminate the ‘contract.’”).
9. See, e.g., Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Director, Federal Trade Commission, et al., to Wesley
Chesbro, Senator, Cal. State Senate (Aug. 24, 2005) (articulating that a proposal to prohibit a brewer from
terminating a distribution contract except for “good cause” would effectively limit all brewer terminations by
causing “substantial legal costs to switch wholesalers . . . even in circumstances where a wholesaler breached”
the contract).
10. See AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted)
(requiring a brewer terminating with “good cause” to provide: evidence of the distributor’s breach of the contract’s
reasonable terms, written notice of the distributor’s failure to comply with the contract, and time to present a
corrective action plan and cure the violation).
11. See, e.g., Howard Weiss-Tisman, Craft Brewers and Distributors Both Bitter over Updated Franchise
Bill, VT. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.vpr.org/post/craft-brewers-and-distributors-both-bitter-overupdated-franchise-bill (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing how craft brewers
dislike beer franchise laws because they lock brewers into distribution contracts that limit brewers’ “control over
the future of their companies”); see also David Keith, Massachusetts Franchise Law Reform is Top Priority for
New Guild President in 2020, ABSOLUTE BEER (Feb. 20, 2020), https://absolutebeer.com/news/massachusettsfranchise-law-reform-is-priority-for-new-guild-president-in-2020/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (explaining that craft brewers oppose beer franchise laws because the limits on termination “leave
[brewers] in limbo”).
12. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted);
accord Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Res-Care Inc., 529 F.3d 649, 662 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing the
strong judicial preference for freedom of contract); see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1,
16 (1986) (holding that commercial entities have a protected right not to “propound political messages with which
they disagree”); see, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 222 (1827) (“[the obligation of contracts] springs from
a higher source: from these great principles of universal law, which are binding on societies of men as well as on
individuals.”); see also Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923) (explaining that freedom of contract
is not absolute, but is “the general rule and restraint the exception . . . .”).
13. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1975)
(citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)) (protecting speech
“propos[ing] a commercial transaction”).
14. See generally AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but
not enacted) (recognizing prior contracts between beer manufacturers and distributors are unenforceable).
15. See id. (stating brewers can only terminate for good cause and have the burden of proof).
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provisions they freely negotiated to protect themselves from distributors. 16 By
requiring manufacturers of all sizes to remain in distribution contracts, AB 1541
would have hurt craft brewers, compelled speech in those contracts, and violated
the First Amendment.17
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Recently, California legislators intervened in beer distribution contracts by
passing beer franchise laws. 18 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of the United States
has expanded commercial speech jurisprudence to protect speech in economic
activity.19 Section A examines California’s existing beer franchise law. 20 Section
B discusses contracts and speech.21 Section C outlines the Court’s commercial
speech jurisprudence, compelled speech jurisprudence, and judicial review
standards in free speech cases.22
A. California Laws on Beer Distribution Agreements
While California has some of the most favorable alcohol laws for craft
brewers, the Legislature has recently implemented laws providing more protection
to beer distributors.23 Subsection 1 provides a primer on tied-house laws in

16. See id. (limiting the circumstances under which a brewer may terminate a distribution contract,
regardless of any contract provisions to the contrary).
17. See Pac. Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 16 (holding that compelled speech violates the First Amendment);
see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565–66 (2011) (implying some commercial speech deserves
greater protection than it traditionally receives).
18. See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25000.2–25000.9 (West 2020) (establishing California’s
first beer franchise law with required terms regarding distribution territory, contract transfer and termination, and
dispute resolution).
19. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–66 (stating “heightened scrutiny” should apply to content-based
commercial speech restrictions and suggesting that this standard was strict scrutiny); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980) (establishing intermediate scrutiny as the standard for
commercial speech).
20. Infra Section II.A.
21. Infra Section II.B.
22. Infra Section II.C.
23. See Evan Pitchford, Relationships Between Producers, Wholesalers, and Retailers: Beer Distribution
and Franchise Laws in California (Part 2), CONKLE, KREMER & ENGEL (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.conklelaw.com/relationships-between-producers-wholesalers-and-retailers-beer-distribution-andfranchise-laws-in-california-part-2 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“California’s beer
franchise laws are some of the most accommodating in the country, because California allows the distribution
agreement itself to control most of the important terms and dealings between the brewer and the wholesaler.”);
see, e.g., AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted)
(proposing a good cause requirement for brewers in California’s beer franchise law in 2019); see also Letter from
Maureen K. Ohlhausen et al., to Wesley Chesbro, supra note 9 (advocating against a potential 2005 amendment
to add a good cause requirement to California’s beer franchise law because it would harm small craft brewers,
reduce competition, and raise beer prices for the consumer). See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25000.2–
25000.9 (West 2020) (instituting California’s beer franchise law in 2000).

260

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52
California.24 Subsection 2 discusses California’s current beer franchise law. 25
1. California’s Tied-House Laws
California divides the beer industry into three tiers—manufacturing,
distribution, and retail. 26 Manufacturers brew beer and either sell it in their
taprooms, directly distribute it to retailers, or contract with a distributor that sells
it to retailers.27 A distribution contract is essential to a craft brewer’s growth if it
lacks the capital to scale up self-distribution beyond its local region.28 State law
separates the three tiers to prevent unfair competition by prohibiting manufacturers
from owning or influencing the other tiers. 29 If manufacturers could integrate or
influence a second tier (i.e., a retailer), they would decrease competition, reduce
consumer choice, and raise beer prices. 30 Because of these restrictions, a brewer
must enter into a distribution contract to expand beyond its taproom and selfdistribution to local retailers.31
2. Current California Beer Franchise Law
Freedom of contract principles governed the brewer–distributor relationship
for sixty-seven years until 2000 when the California Legislature enacted Senate
Bill (SB) 1957.32 The California Beer and Beverage Distributors sponsored SB
1957 to address disparities between manufacturers and distributors—large

24. Infra Subsection II.A.1.
25. Infra Subsection II.A.2.
26. Thomas A. Gerhart, Undermining the Law: How Uninformed Legislating Helps Big Beer Erode
California’s Tied-House Laws, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 25, 30 (2019).
27. Evan Pitchford, Producer, Wholesaler and Retailer Relationships: Beer Distribution and Franchise
Laws in California (Part 1), CONKLE, KREMER & ENGEL (Sept. 10, 2017), http://www.conklelaw.com/producerwholesaler-and-retailer-relationships-beer-distribution-and-franchise-laws-in-california-part-1 (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
28. See BEER AND LAW, supra note 8 (mentioning how craft brewers “inevitably” enter into distribution
contracts); Pitchford, supra note 23 (“As a brand increases in local popularity and the beer producer wants to
expand its footprint and accelerate its competition . . . outside its home region, usually the producer will choose
to enter into a distribution agreement.”); see also Kary Shumway, Brewbound Voices: Deconstructing SelfDistribution (Part I), BREWBOUND (July 3, 2017, 3:14 PM), https://www.brewbound.com/news/brewboundvoices-deconstructing-self-distribution-part (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (observing the
high barrier to entry in self-distribution and that successful self-distributing craft brewers operate locally).
29. Gerhart, supra note 26, at 30–31.
30. See Cal. Beer Wholesalers Ass’n v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 5 Cal. 3d 402, 408 (1971)
(en banc) (“By enacting prohibitions against ‘tied-house’ arrangements, state legislatures aimed to prevent . . .
large firms [from dominating] local markets through vertical and horizontal integration.”); see also Allied
Properties v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal. 2d 141, 148 (1959) (en banc) (upholding tied-house
laws because “the public will be adequately protected against excessive prices”).
31. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23357 (West 2020); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25500 (West 2020).
32. Compare 1933 Cal. Stat. ch. 658, §§ 1–3, 39 at 1697–98, 1707 (establishing the first alcohol laws in
California since Prohibition), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020) (enacting California’s first
beer franchise law).
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manufacturers pressured distributors into one-sided contracts that manufacturers
could freely terminate. 33 SB 1957 prohibited a manufacturer’s termination of a beer
distribution contract for a distributor’s failure to meet an unreasonable sales goal.34
The Legislature intended SB 1957 to reduce distributor loses by limiting
brewers’ ability to terminate distribution contracts. 35 However, large
manufacturers ignore the law and continue to freely terminate agreements by
leveraging their superior resources. 36 Ultimately, the distribution lobby is
dissatisfied and has attempted to change the law for years. 37
B. Contracts and Speech
The fundamental components of a contract are offer, acceptance, and
consideration.38 Contracting parties express these elements through words or
actions that objectively form a promise. 39 The offeror proposes to do or give

33. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1957, at 1–4 (Aug. 29, 2000)
(discussing how the California Beer and Beverage Distributors sponsored SB 1957 to solve unequal bargaining
power between consolidating manufacturers and small distributors); see also Brian D. Anhalt, Crafting a Model
State Law for Today’s Beer Industry, 21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 162, 163–64 (2016) (explaining that beer
franchise laws stem from past disparities between large manufacturers and small distributors); Pitchford, supra
note 23. Compare The Beer Community, Macro Brewery vs. Micro Brewery vs. Craft Brewery – What is the
Difference?, JUST BEER (Jan. 15, 2019), https://justbeerapp.com/article/macro-brewery-vs-micro-brewery-vscraft-brewery-what-is-the-difference (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“A macro brewery
is a large, national or international brewery that produces and distributes more than 6 million barrels of beer per
year. . . . brewed in very large quantities.”), with BREWERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 2 (“An American craft
brewer is a small and independent brewer.”).
34. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020).
35. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1957, at 2–4 (Aug. 29, 2000).
36. See, e.g., Justin Kendall, Constellation Brands Forces Distributor Change in Northern San Diego
County, BREWBOUND (June 7, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.brewbound.com/news/constellation-brands-forcesdistributor-change-northern-san-diego-county (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting
that Constellation Brands freely terminated a distribution contract after the distributor agreed to the
disadvantageous deal because it lacked resources to engage in a long and costly legal dispute); Jessica Infante,
Reyes Makes 3rd California Wholesaler Acquisition of 2019 with W.A. Thompson Deal, BREWBOUND (Oct. 8,
2019, 5:25 PM), https://www.brewbound.com/news/reyes-makes-3rd-california-wholesaler-acquisition-of-2019with-w-a-thompson-deal (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). But see Bernot, supra note 6
(discussing how there are currently a few consolidating distributors with unequal bargaining power compared to
craft brewers).
37. E.g., AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted)
(mandating good cause requirements in all beer distribution contracts); see also Letter from Maureen K.
Ohlhausen et al., to Wesley Chesbro, supra note 9 (discussing a potential 2005 bill amendment to add good cause
restrictions to California’s beer franchise law).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating a contract is
formed when there is a “manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration”); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (clarifying that “mutual assent to an
exchange” is “an offer or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance by the other party”). See generally
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1605–1606 (West 2020) (defining consideration as any bargained for benefit, forbearance, or
legal or moral obligation given to the promisor “as an inducement”).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A contract is a promise or a
set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way
recognizes as a duty.”); see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
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something in exchange for a thing of value from the offeree. 40 Next, the offeree
may accept, reject, or make a counteroffer. 41 Contracts operate through speech
whether the parties vocalize, write, or perform it. 42
Though contracts operate through speech, the Supreme Court has yet to
determine whether contracts are constitutionally protected speech. 43 However, the
Ninth Circuit touched on the issue in Nordyke v. Santa Clara County.44 In Nordyke,
gun show entrants challenged a county lease with a fairgrounds operator that
prohibited “offering for sale” guns or ammunition at gun shows on the
fairgrounds.45 The Ninth Circuit held the ban violated the First Amendment
because “offer[s] to sell” items propose commercial transactions, so they are
constitutionally protected commercial speech.46 The Nordyke holding came just
short of stating contracts are speech.47
C. Supreme Court Free Speech Jurisprudence
Under the First Amendment, the government cannot abridge the freedom of
speech.48 Generally, speech is entitled to the highest level of protection under the
First Amendment unless it falls within certain narrow exceptions. 49 However, the
government may regulate protected speech if the law passes the appropriate

(establishing acceptance as a “manifestation of assent” to the offer’s terms); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (defining offer as the “manifestation of willingness to enter into a
bargain” so that another person would understand that “assent to that bargain is invited”).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 22(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 35(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 38 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
42. Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 177, 185 (2015).
43. See VICTORIA L. KILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. IN FOCUS, IF11072, THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
CATEGORIES OF SPEECH (2019) (mentioning that “many aspects of ‘human communication remain[] untouched
by the First Amendment . . .’” including contracts (citing JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 788 (12th ed. 2015))); see also Shanor, supra note 42, at 205 (“The
regulation of contracts . . . is generally not subject to First Amendment review.”). But see Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570–71 (2011) (suggesting the sale of data may be constitutionally protected speech).
44. Nordyke v. Santa Clara Cty., 110 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1997).
45. Id. at 708–10.
46. See id. at 710 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976)) (holding that offers for the legal sale of guns and ammunition are commercial speech because they
“propose a commercial transaction”).
47. Id. at 710.
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”).
49. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (listing obscenity, defamation, fraud,
incitement, and “speech integral to criminal conduct” as types of speech traditionally subject to censorship or
punishment); see, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (denying fighting words—
the “very utterance [of which] inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”—protection under
the First Amendment because they fall into a “well-defined and narrowly limited [class] of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”); see also Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (providing commercial speech less protection
than political speech).
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standard of review.50 Subsection 1 tracks Supreme Court commercial speech
jurisprudence.51 Subsection 2 reviews the compelled speech doctrine. 52 Subsection
3 considers standards of judicial review. 53
1. Supreme Court Commercial Speech Jurisprudence
Though Supreme Court commercial speech jurisprudence affords protection
to commercial speech, it provides less protection to commercial speech than other
forms of speech.54 As a result, the Court often hesitates to strike down economic
regulations that restrict commercial speech.55 The Court explained this weaker
protection in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.56 In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court protected commercial speech—
i.e., speech “propos[ing] a commercial transaction”—but identified a
“commonsense” difference between commercial speech and other types of
speech.57 The Court held commercial speech serves the First Amendment’s goals,
explaining the Framers intended it to protect enlightened decision making and the
free flow of speech.58 However, the Court noted that it accords commercial speech
less protection because proposing a transaction has slightly less value in facilitating
free thought and democratic decision-making.59
Recently, the Court expanded Virginia Pharmacy’s holding in Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc.60 In Sorrell, the Court held that a government prohibition on the “sale

50. See KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-815, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS:
EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (2014) (noting that the government may regulate speech even if it is
constitutionally protected).
51. Infra Subsection II.C.1.
52. Infra Subsection II.C.2.
53. Infra Subsection II.C.3.
54. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761–62 (1975)
(protecting advertising as speech, but distinguishing commercial speech from other types of speech).
55. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980)
(expressing that commercial speech restrictions receive less scrutiny and commercial speech receives less
protection than other speech).
56. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770–73.
57. Id. at 771 n.24 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
58. Id. at 765.
It is a matter of public interest that [private economic decisions in a free enterprise economy], in the aggregate,
be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if it
is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the
formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the
First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision-making in a democracy,
we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal. (citations omitted).
Id.
59. See id. at 762–63 (stating that parties to a transaction enjoy First Amendment protection, but their
interests relate to economics and the free flow of information as opposed to an interest in democratic decisionmaking).
60. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563–64 (2011) (articulating conduct in a commercial
transaction constitutes speech).
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[and] disclosure” of marketing information unconstitutionally abridged speech
because it limited the free flow of information.61 The Court found the restriction
was content-based and disfavored marketing from pharmaceutical companies
because those companies could not obtain marketing information that other
speakers could freely purchase and use.62 Since the law explicitly prohibited
pharmaceutical companies from disclosing or agreeing to sell information, the
Court held it was unconstitutional under “heightened scrutiny.”63
In Sorrell, the Court implicitly acknowledged contracts are constitutionally
protected speech because it suggested the dissemination of information—even by
sale—is speech.64 Though the Court came close to subjecting contract regulation
to First Amendment review, it did not decide whether a contract is constitutionally
protected speech.65 The Court’s focus on whether the restriction was content-based
is a test the Court traditionally reserves for noncommercial speech. 66 As a result,
the Court shifted its analysis and expanded commercial speech protections. 67
2. The Compelled Speech Doctrine
The First Amendment also limits the government from compelling speech.68
For example, in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.,
the Court held as unconstitutional a government-compelled disclosure of a
charity’s prior revenues. 69 The Court stated distinctions between compelled and
restricted speech are insignificant because the First Amendment protects “both

61. See id. (“On its face, Vermont’s law enacts content- and speaker-based restrictions on the sale,
disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information. . . . The statute thus disfavors marketing, that is, speech
with a particular content. More than that, the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical
manufacturers.”).
62. Id.; see Government Restraint on Content of Expression, CORNELL LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/government-restraint-of-content-of-expression
(last visited Aug. 10, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that content-based
restrictions regulate speech based on “message, ideas, subject matter, or content”).
63. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–65 (2011).
64. Id. at 570–71; see also Seth E. Mermin & Samantha K. Graff, The First Amendment and Public Health,
at Odds, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 298, 303–04 (2013) (discussing how companies re-define non-expressive practices
“as protected speech” by claiming all activities are marketing because courts “consider marketing to be protected
speech”).
65. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570–71 (“[T]his case can be resolved even assuming . . . that prescriber
identifying information is a mere commodity [as opposed to speech].”) (finding unconstitutional a prohibition on
pharmacies selling data to pharmaceutical companies for marketing but not deciding whether the sale of data itself
was constitutionally protected speech).
66. Id. at 563–67.
67. See id. at 563–65 (applying “heightened scrutiny” rather than the traditional commercial speech
analysis).
68. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (establishing the compelled speech
doctrine after a law required children to salute the American flag in school, but a child refused to do so for
religious reasons).
69. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988).
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what to say and what not to say.”70
However, the Court’s holding in Riley—the distinction between compelled
speech and restricted speech lacks constitutional significance—is not the complete
body of compelled speech jurisprudence.71 One year before Riley, the Court upheld
a compelled disclosure in Meese v. Keene requiring “persons engaging in [foreign]
propaganda” to disclose certain information.72 The Court held the disclosures did
not restrain speech but instructed propagandists to make disclosures allowing the
public to evaluate the information fairly.73 Rather than suppressing the fact that the
information was propaganda, these government-compelled disclosures facilitated
the free flow of information—a goal of the First Amendment.74 As a result, the
Court found the disclosure requirement was constitutional. 75
Compelled speech receives less protection in the commercial context than in
the noncommercial context.76 For example, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, the Court held government-compelled
disclosures of facts in advertising are constitutional.77 The Court found commercial
speakers’ rights “not to divulge accurate information” about their services are not
“fundamental.”78 Like in Meese, the Court claimed it was beneficial for
commercial speakers to provide additional, non-misleading information.79
Accordingly, the Court interprets the First Amendment to protect against
compelled commercial speech, but to a lesser degree than noncommercial speech.80
3. Basic Standards of Judicial Review
The Court does not interpret the First Amendment to protect speech equally;
rather, the level of judicial deference to the political branches defines the level of

70. Id. at 796–97.
71. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480–82 (1987) (finding that a statute making a citizen disclose
information was constitutional and benefitted the public by promoting the free flow of information); see, e.g.,
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding that compelled commercial
disclosures are constitutional under certain circumstances); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)) (finding that a required disclosure of
electioneering funding sources was constitutional even though it burdens speakers because the disclosures were
of facts, did not require the speaker to communicate a message they disagreed with, did not prevent speech, and
“impose[d] no ceiling on campaign-related activities”). See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Comm.
Comm’n, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) (upholding must-carry channel rules imposed on cable companies because
they “further important governmental interests; and . . . do not burden substantially more speech than necessary”).
72. Meese, 481 U.S. at 469.
73. Id. at 480–82.
74. Id. at 481–82.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (finding that compelled commercial disclosures are constitutional
if they are reasonably related to a government interest).
77. Id. at 651 & n.14.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 & n.14.
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protection.81 Unless a law presents significant constitutional issues, courts often
defer to the government.82 The applicable standard depends on the speech and law
at issue.83 The three main standards are rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and
strict scrutiny.84 These standards of review are fundamental to assess
constitutionality.85 Subsection a outlines the rational basis test. 86 Subsection b
reviews intermediate scrutiny.87 Subsection c explains strict scrutiny.88
a. Rational Basis Review
Under rational basis review, the Court affords the government the greatest
amount of deference.89 In other words, a law is constitutional if the government
reasonably related it to a legitimate government interest. 90 The Court considers
nearly any purpose legitimate. 91 Yet the particular interest and whether the law is
achieving this purpose are not determinative; the law can be over-inclusive or
under-inclusive.92 Rather, the Court focuses on whether there is “any reasonably

81. KILLION, supra note 43; RUANE, supra note 50, at 1.
82. See generally Richard Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519,
522 (2012) (outlining the history of judicial deference).
83. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); KILLION, supra note 43.
84. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (establishing
intermediate scrutiny as the proper standard of review for commercial speech restrictions, even if they are content
based); see, e.g., Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (holding that compelled disclosures are constitutional so long as they
are to inform customers of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” and are reasonably related to a state
interest); see also Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642 (articulating how strict scrutiny applies to content-based
speech restrictions).
85. Infra Section IV.B.
86. Infra Subsection II.C.1.a.
87. Infra Subsection II.C.1.b.
88. Infra Subsection II.C.1.c.
89. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (“[A]n advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest . . .”).
90. Id.
91. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834–35 (1987) (citations omitted) (“Our cases have
not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a ‘legitimate state interest’ . . . . however, . . . a
broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements.”); see, e.g., City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1976) (finding that protecting the “appearance and custom valued by
the [French] Quarter’s residents and attractive to tourists” to be a legitimate interest because “the judiciary may
not . . . judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect
fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines”). But see U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–
35 (1973) (holding that a bare desire to harm an unpopular group cannot be a legitimate purpose unless there is a
rationally related public purpose supporting the desire).
92. See Fed. Comm. Comm’n v. Beach Comm., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (finding that government
actions can be based on “rational speculation” and that the party challenging the regulation must “negat[e] every
conceivable basis which might support it”); see, e,g., Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dept. of Econ. Dev.,
438 F.3d 195, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding an affirmative action statute under rational basis even though it
was under-inclusive); see also N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 522 U.S. 196, 209 (2008) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (“[A]s I recall my esteemed former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on numerous
occasions: ‘The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws.’”). But see First Nat’l Bank
of Bos. v. Bellotti 435 U.S. 765, 792–93 (1978) (“The statute is said to serve [a legitimate] interest by preventing
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conceivable state of facts” that indicate “plausible reasons” for government
action.93 Rational basis review no longer applies to commercial speech by default,
but the Court still occasionally applies it to commercial speech. 94
b. Intermediate Scrutiny
Intermediate scrutiny is more demanding than rational basis review and
requires the government to show the law is substantially related to an important
government interest. 95 The Court applies intermediate scrutiny to commercial
speech restrictions and content-neutral restrictions on speech.96 Content-neutral
restrictions do not limit speech based on content but rather on “the time, place, and
manner of expression.”97 Intermediate scrutiny applies even though commercial
speech regulations are inherently content-based (i.e., the regulations limit speech
based on message or viewpoint).98
Under intermediate scrutiny in the commercial speech context, the Court
applies the four-prong test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v.
Public Services Commission of New York.99 Central Hudson first requires that the
speech is lawful and not misleading.100 Next, the government interest must be
substantial, and then the law must “directly advance” that interest. 101 Finally, the
restriction must not be “more extensive than is necessary” to effectuate the
government’s interest. 102 A law violates the First Amendment if the speech

the use of corporate resources in furtherance of views with which some shareholders may disagree. This purpose
is belied, however, by the provisions of the statute, which are both underinclusive and overinclusive.”).
93. Beach Comm., 508 U.S. at 313–14.
94. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[L]egislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless . . . it is of such a character as to preclude
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”);
see, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 490–91 (1955) (upholding an advertising regulation under
rational basis review); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63,
566 (1980) (applying intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech). But see, e.g., Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651, 652
& n.14 (upholding a compelled disclosure preventing consumer deception under rational basis because “[an
advertiser’s] constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his
advertising is minimal. . . . The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his
services is not . . . a fundamental right”).
95. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63, 566 (using a four-part test for intermediate scrutiny that includes
determining whether a regulation directly advances a substantial government interest).
96. Id.
97. RUANE, supra note 50, at 9.
98. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6, 566 (finding that “[i]n most other contexts” the First
Amendment prohibits content-based regulations, but that the government may restrict commercial speech based
on content unless the law fails the intermediate scrutiny test); see Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Ser. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 530, 538 & n.5 (1980) (stating commercial speech is a “narrow circumstance” in which “regulation based
on subject matter” is acceptable); RUANE, supra note 50, at 9.
99. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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satisfies prong one and the law fails prongs two, three, or four.103 If the speech fails
prong one, it is not subject to the Central Hudson test but to the rational basis
test.104 Central Hudson is the default test for commercial speech restrictions.105
c. Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny is the most rigorous standard of review.106 This test requires that
the government “narrowly tailor” a speech restriction to use the “least restrictive
means” to achieve a compelling government interest.107 The Court rarely finds an
interest compelling, reflecting the demands of strict scrutiny as the Court reserves
it for when the government favors one idea over another. 108
As such, the Court applies strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions—i.e.,
laws that limit speech based on topic or message—unless it is commercial
speech.109 The Court views laws that compel noncommercial speech as contentbased restrictions, and so the Court analyzes those laws under strict scrutiny. 110
However, the Court suggested “heightened scrutiny” applies to restrictions
singling out one commercial speaker based on content. 111 There is a circuit split on
the definition of “heightened scrutiny”—courts dispute whether intermediate or

103. Id.
104. Id.; see, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (applying rational
basis to misleading commercial speech).
105. KILLION, supra note 43; RUANE, supra note 50, at 15.
106. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
107. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 680 (“Content based speech restrictions are generally
unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.”); Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v.
Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
108. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003) (holding that preventing perceived
corruption and maintaining election integrity are compelling interests) (overturned by Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S 310); see, e.g., Sable Comm., 492 U.S. at 126 (reiterating that “protecting the physical
and psychological well-being of minors” is a compelling interest); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional. . . . When the
government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the
First Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content
discrimination. The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or
the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale . . .
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–29.
109. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 & n.6, 566 (explaining that “the First Amendment prohibits
content-based regulations” in other contexts, but commercial speech is analyzed under intermediate scrutiny);
Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Ser. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 & n.5 (1980); RUANE, supra note 50, at 5, 9.
110. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795, 800 (1988) (“Mandating speech that a
speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech. We therefore consider the act as a
content-based regulation of speech. . . . [Content-based restrictions require] compelling necessity.”).
111. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565–66 (2011) (stating “heightened scrutiny” should
apply to content-based commercial speech restrictions and suggesting that this standard was strict scrutiny). But
see Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Prieto 861 F.3d 839, 847–49 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding that Sorrell’s
“heightened scrutiny” is intermediate scrutiny).
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strict scrutiny applies.112 Accordingly, the analysis of whether a law compelling
commercial speech is constitutional—say in beer distribution contracts—changes
depending on the relevant circuit’s definition of heightened scrutiny.113
III. AB 1541
AB 1541 would have prohibited a brewer from terminating a beer distribution
contract unless the brewer satisfied certain “good cause” requirements. 114 To
establish good cause, the brewer needed to show the distributor did not satisfy the
contract’s commercially reasonable terms without justification or excuse.115 Next,
the bill required the brewer to provide the distributor evidence and written notice
of the distributor’s failure to comply with the contract. 116 The brewer needed to
provide the distributor written notice within a certain number of months of
discovering the distributor’s failure.117 If the brewer failed to provide the
distributor notice within the timeframe, the brewer would have waived its right to
terminate the agreement. 118 Finally, AB 1541 required the brewer to give the
distributor time to create and implement a corrective action plan that would cure
the violation.119 The bill left all timeframes undefined.120
Even if a brewer could establish good cause, the brewer needed to satisfy
additional conditions.121 For example, a brewer must have demonstrated it acted in
good faith—i.e., the brewer acted in a “commercially reasonable” and honest
manner.122 If the distributor failed to cure the violation in time, the brewer would
need to provide the distributor with additional written notice of termination before

112. See Retail Dig. Network, 861 F.3d at 847–48 (finding that Central Hudson applies to content-based
commercial speech restrictions). But see Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 297–98 (4th
Cir. 2013) (acknowledging that the Central Hudson test is likely not Sorrell’s heightened scrutiny); accord Reed
v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (suggesting “heightened scrutiny” is strict scrutiny).
113. Compare Retail Dig. Network, 861 F.3d at 848 (finding that Central Hudson applies to content-based
commercial speech restrictions), with Educ. Media, 731 F.3d at 297–98 (acknowledging that the Central Hudson
test is likely not Sorrell’s heightened scrutiny).
114. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted)
(failing to define timeframes for waiver and for a distributor to provide a compliance plan or cure a violation;
e.g., “The beer manufacturer first acquired knowledge of the failure . . . not more than __ months before the date
notification was given to the beer wholesaler.”).
121. Id.
122. Id.; see Gifford v. J & A Holdings, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 253, 259 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1997)
(“Commercial reasonableness is not expressly defined in the statute, but has been defined elsewhere to include
commonly accepted commercial practices of responsible businesses which afford all parties fair treatment.”); see
also Citri-Lite Co. v. Cott Beverages, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 2d 912, 924–26 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that
“commercial reasonableness” is based on what a reasonable business would do under similar circumstances).
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exiting the contract.123 The bill would have forced a brewer to explicitly state its
intent to terminate the contract, the particular reasons for termination, and the date
of effective termination.124 AB 1541 required the brewer to prove it acted in good
faith, had good cause, and satisfied the notice requirements. 125 A brewer could only
terminate a distribution contract if it could demonstrate it satisfied these
requirements and the distributor failed to cure the violation before the effective
termination.126
IV. ANALYSIS
AB 1541 would have harmed craft brewers because it made terminating a
distribution contract nearly impossible.127 Delays in the termination process might
not have harmed large manufacturers, but they would have burdened small craft
brewers who often have fewer resources to put into litigating a dispute. 128 Most
craft brewers remain in distribution contracts despite poor sales, effectively “superglu[ing]” brands to distributors.129
AB 1541 would have burdened craft brewers by altering brewers’ speech and
compelling contractual language that restricts their ability to terminate a beer
distribution contract. 130 The Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence indicates
contracts are speech because contracts propose and regulate commercial
transactions.131 AB 1541 would have compelled commercial speech by mandating
that a brewer and distributor include certain provisions within a distribution
agreement that neither party included on its own.132 In fact, craft brewers avoid
good cause restrictions because those provisions could trap brewers in distribution
contracts with neglectful distributors.133 Nevertheless, the Court’s application of a
particular standard of review is inconsistent in this context. 134
123. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Michael Carroll, Bill Would Impede Competition in California Beer Industry, Critics Say, N. CAL.
REC. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://norcalrecord.com/stories/528707518-bill-would-impede-competition-in-californiabeer-industry-critics-say (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
128. See id. (“‘In many, many cases . . . craft brewers . . . simply don’t have the resources to litigate’ . . .
such cases could cost millions of dollars and take years to adjudicate.”) (quoting the California Craft Brewers
Association director).
129. Id.
130. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (holding that a compelled disclosure
altered speech because it forced people to say things they otherwise would not).
131. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1975)
(citing Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)) (protecting speech
“propos[ing] a commercial transaction”); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570–71 (2011)
(considering the dissemination of information—even by sale—to be speech).
132. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted).
133. Weiss-Tisman, supra note 11.
134. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565–66 (stating “heightened scrutiny” should apply to content-based
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Section A evaluates how AB 1541 would have implicated and violated the
First Amendment.135 Section B focuses on standards of review to explain AB
1541’s unconstitutionality.136 Section C proposes a constitutional solution to the
problem that protects craft brewers from harmful distribution contracts.137
A. AB 1541 and the First Amendment
The Supreme Court first defined commercial speech as “speech that . . .
propose[s] a commercial transaction” in the context of advertising restrictions. 138
Contracts similarly propose commercial transactions through offer and
acceptance.139 AB 1541 would have mandated terms in beer distribution contracts,
altering speech by substituting the parties’ freely negotiated speech for Legislative
judgments.140 As a result, AB 1541 likely would have unconstitutionally compelled
commercial speech.141 Courts should afford commercial speech protections to
contracts.142 Subsection 1 explains why contracts are speech. 143 Subsection 2
evaluates how AB 1541 would have compelled speech. 144

commercial speech restrictions and suggesting that this standard was strict scrutiny); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (applying rational basis review to restrictions on misleading
commercial speech); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(explaining that intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard to apply to a content-based commercial speech
restrictions).
135. Infra Section IV.A.
136. Infra Section IV.B.
137. Infra Section IV.C.
138. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1975)
(citing Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 22(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST.
1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 2(1)–(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST.
1981); Shanor, supra note 42, at 182, 185.
140. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted);
see Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (“Mandating speech that a speaker would not
otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.”); see also Nordyke v. Santa Clara Cty., 110 F.3d
707, 710 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that an offer to sell a firearm is commercial speech entitled to First Amendment
protection).
141. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted);
see Riley, 487 U.S. at 784, 795 (finding that a North Carolina law mandating charities to disclose revenues
unconstitutionally altered speech); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (noting
that “unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected
commercial speech”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(detailing the intermediate scrutiny standard for commercial speech cases); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S.
552, 565–66 (2011).
142. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 (explaining that commercial speech that is nonmisleading receives First Amendment protection because laws restricting commercial speech are inherently
content-based); see also Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–64 (finding a Vermont law restricting pharmaceutical companies
from selling, disclosing, or using prescriber data was an unconstitutional commercial speech restriction).
143. Infra Subsection IV.A.1.
144. Infra Subsection IV.A.2.
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1. Beer Distribution Contracts are Commercial Speech
Treating contracts as speech is intuitive—nearly every interaction involves
expressive speech, including contracting—but a court has not yet explicitly
recognized this reasoning.145 The logical conclusion from Nordyke’s holding is that
contracts are commercial speech because—like advertisements—they propose
commercial transactions through offer and acceptance. 146 When parties enter into
a beer distribution contract, they make promises and communicate terms that
define the transaction and regulate their relationship.147 In other words, making a
promise is a form of speech when the parties articulate an offer and acceptance that
both proposes and ratifies a transaction.148 Following Nordyke’s logic, a contract
is commercial speech because it communicates offer and acceptance.149 Thus,
courts should treat beer distribution contracts as commercial speech. 150 As a result,
laws regulating contracts would receive First Amendment review.151
2. How AB 1541 Would Have Compelled Speech
AB 1541 would have compelled speech by mandating that manufacturers have
good cause to terminate their beer distribution contracts, despite not contracting

145. See Shanor, supra note 42, at 177 (“Nearly all human action operates . . . through speech, or at least
in such a fashion that another human being could understand it as expressive. . . . The conduct of buying a car,
for instance, involves conversations with the dealer, the offer of a price, and the signing of a contract that is
written in words.”); see, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
527, 564–79 (2015) (discussing different legal theories and approaches to return to constitutional protection of
freedom of contract); cf. Nordyke, 110 F.3d at 710 (holding an offer to sell firearms or ammunition is commercial
speech).
146. Nordyke, 110 F.3d at 710; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1981); Shanor, supra note 42 at 182, 205; see Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 (finding that restrictions
on prescription drug advertisements were unconstitutional content-based commercial speech restrictions).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 22(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST.
1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1)–(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (defining a promise
as “a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way” which the parties understand to
make a commitment); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“Manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that each party either make a promise or begin or render
a performance.”).
149. Nordyke, 110 F.3d at 710; Shanor, supra note 42 at 182.
150. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770–71 (finding a Virginia prohibition on prescription
drug advertising to be an unconstitutional commercial speech restriction, but noting that the government can still
regulate commercial speech in certain circumstances); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 & n.6 (1980) (explaining the intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech cases
and that in other contexts the First Amendment prohibits content-based speech restrictions).
151. See Shanor, supra note 42 at 182 (“[I]f banning sales—under the logic that they involve the
communicative elements of offer and acceptance—triggers First Amendment review, little if any commercial
activity falls outside of the First Amendment’s ambit.”).
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for that requirement.152 These mandatory provisions would compel speech
because—as in Riley—AB 1541 would have forced manufacturers to adopt
contractual language that is not their own.153 Good cause termination restrictions
do not protect craft brewers, yet AB 1541 would have forced brewers to include
those restrictions in distribution contracts. 154
Unlike Meese, nothing about AB 1541’s compelled good cause termination
provisions related to the free flow of information.155 Therefore, Meese is irrelevant
while Riley is on point because AB 1541 and beer distribution contracts do not
involve the flow of information but merely define commercial transactions.156
Instead, AB 1541 would have compelled speech by forcing craft brewers to include
specific terms in distribution contracts rather than allowing them to contract for
different terms.157 AB 1541 would have precluded craft brewers from including
brewer-friendly terms, or even terminating with cause to sell to other distributors,
because brewers usually lack resources to litigate. 158 Craft brewers would have no
“satisfactory alternative channels” to negotiate no-cause terms or form contracts
with different distributors, so AB 1541 would compel speech.159
AB 1541 would have unconstitutionally compelled speech because brewers
could not include certain speech in contracts or freely contract with other
distributors to include that speech.160 As a result, AB 1541 would not have
facilitated free thought and educated decision making.161 Rather, AB 1541 would
152. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (explaining how a law mandating
speech necessarily alters and compels speech); AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended
on July 11, 2019, but not enacted).
153. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 795 (detailing how compelling speech by altering what the speaker would say
is necessarily a content-based regulation).
154. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted);
Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed, Director, Federal Trade Commission, et al., to Jim Wood, Assembly Member, State
of California (Mar. 20, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); Carroll, supra note 127.
155. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480 (1987) (upholding compelled disclosure because it related to
the free flow of information).
156. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted);
see Riley, 487 U.S. at 795 (analyzing the nature of commercial speech); Meese, 481 U.S. at 480 (identifying the
flow of information); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980)
(defining commercial speech); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
776 (1975) (holding that “a communication which does no more than propose a commercial transaction is not
‘wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment’”) (Stewart, J., concurring).
157. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted);
see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502–03 (1996) (expressing concern that a commercial
speech restriction targeted “truthful, nonmisleading” speech because it “not only hinder[ed] consumer choice, but
also imped[ed] debate over central issues of public policy”).
158. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502–03 (1996); AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020
Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted); Carroll, supra note 127.
159. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501–02; Carroll, supra note 127; see Riley, 487 U.S. at 797 (“[T]he First
Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and
what not to say.”).
160. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted).
161. See Meese, 481 U.S. at 480 n.15 (citing Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251) (articulating that
free thought and educated decision making are the goals of the First Amendment, and that compelled speech
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have restricted speech based on content and would have allowed the Legislature to
favor distributor speech over brewer speech.162 Because the Court disfavors
content-based restrictions, AB 1541 likely would have violated the First
Amendment.163
B. Why AB 1541 is Unconstitutional
Since contracts are commercial speech, intermediate scrutiny presumably
would have applied to AB 1541.164 However, it is important to distinguish AB
1541 from other speech restrictions because of the Zauderer standard.165 Laws
correcting misleading speech receive rational basis review because the speech fails
Central Hudson’s first prong.166 But good cause restrictions do not prevent
consumer deception because distribution contracts are not public. 167 Distribution
contracts are also lawful and factual, so the speech passes Central Hudson’s first
prong.168 Therefore, a court should apply the more demanding intermediate
scrutiny.169
The second prong of the Central Hudson test is that the government interest
must be substantial. 170 Here, the government’s purpose for AB 1541 was to reduce
“monopolistic tendencies,” protect consumer choice, and stabilize prices. 171 The

facilitating those goals is constitutional).
162. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 795 (explaining that laws mandating speech alters what the speaker would
otherwise say, and so such laws are content-based restriction and compel speech).
163. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (“[C]omplete speech bans . . . are particularly dangerous because
they all but foreclose alternative means of disseminating certain information.”); see RUANE, supra note 50, at 1,
5 (noting that the Court applies strict scrutiny—the most difficult standard—to content-based speech restrictions).
164. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
165. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Cent. Hudson’, 447 U.S. at
566; see generally Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the
First Amendment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 557 (2012) (distinguishing Zauderer from Central Hudson by noting
that the speech in Zauderer fails Central Hudson’s first prong).
166. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; Cent. Hudson’, 447 U.S. at 566; Keighley, supra note 165.
167. Cf. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (citations omitted) (“[I]n virtually all our commercial speech decisions
to date, we have emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s
interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, ‘warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in
order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.’”).
168. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.5(1) (West 2020) (requiring a written contract with a brewer
for distributors to sell beer); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
169. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
170. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
171. Carroll, supra note 127; see Benefits of Beer Franchise Laws, NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS ASS’N,
https://www.nbwa.org/government/benefits-of-beer-franchise-laws (last visited Oct. 18, 2020) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (listing “consumer choice–product diversity,” “brewer access–distributor
independence,” and “public safeguards–responsible sales” as key reasons for beer franchise laws). Compare
Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen et al., to Wesley Chesbro, supra note 9 (“One of [the] purported goals is to
‘foster vigorous and healthy inter-brand competition in the beer industry.’ . . . however, the Proposal is likely to
have the opposite effect.”), with Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed et al., to Jim Wood, supra note 154 (explaining that
Chapter X would have an even greater anticompetitive impact than the 2005 Proposal due to industry changes in
the past fifteen years).
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interest in preventing monopolies and maintaining the three-tiered system is a
substantial interest because American law disfavors monopolies. 172 Additionally,
the Twenty-First Amendment permits states—not the federal government—to
regulate the alcohol industry; therefore, the interest is substantial. 173 Because states
regulate the alcohol industry to prevent monopolies, this interest is substantial, and
it would pass prong two.174
Next, AB 1541 must “directly advance” the interest in preventing
monopoly.175 AB 1541 may have prevented monopolies and promoted competition
because franchise laws act as vertical restraints in three-tiered systems; however,
if too strict these restraints become anticompetitive. 176 AB 1541’s termination
restrictions purportedly promoted competition, but—according to the Federal
Trade Commission—they were actually anticompetitive, harm consumer choice,
and will likely increase beer prices. 177 While AB 1541 at first blush appeared to
prevent monopolies, the bill in reality could not advance this interest because it
had severe anticompetitive effects. 178 AB 1541 would have impeded the
government interest, so it fails Central Hudson’s third prong and is
unconstitutional.179
But assuming the bill would have directly advanced the interest, AB 1541
could not be “more extensive” than necessary. 180 Namely, AB 1541 would need to
be “as narrowly drawn as possible to effectuate” the purpose of preventing
monopolies.181 AB 1541 would have failed this prong because it treated all brewers
and distributors the same regardless of size, financing, and power.182 Small brewers
lack the same resources and strength as large manufacturers, so AB 1541 would
have captured brewers that pose little threat to the three-tiered system. 183 The
172. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Ser. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 549 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“[M]onopolies are generally against the public policies of the United States.”); see, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 25500.1 (West 2020) (“The Legislature finds that it is necessary and proper to [separate] manufacturing
interests, wholesale interests, and retail interests in the production and distribution of alcoholic beverages in order
to prevent suppliers from dominating local markets through vertical integration.”).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2017)
(en banc).
174. Retail Dig. Network, 861 F.3d at 844, 850; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
175. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS ASS’N, supra note 171.
176. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, Transaction Cost Economics and Vertical Market
Restrictions, 55 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 587 (2010); James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem
of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639 (2005); Margaret E. Slade, Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of BrewerOwned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?, 108 ECON. J. 565 (1998); Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed et al.,
to Jim Wood, supra note 154; see NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS ASS’N, supra note 171 (“Combined with threetier requirements, franchise laws prohibit vertical integration of the brewing, distribution and retail tiers,
preventing monopolies.”).
177. Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed et al., to Jim Wood, supra note 154.
178. Id.; NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS ASS’N, supra note 171.
179. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 569.
180. Id. at 566.
181. Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 845 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
182. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted).
183. Id.; Carroll, supra note 127; Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed et al., to Jim Wood, supra note 154.
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government should rein in near-monopoly manufacturers that bully distributors,
but AB 1541 was overbroad because it would have burdened the speech of brewers
that cannot possibly monopolize.184 In doing so, AB 1541 was over-inclusive and
would have burdened more speakers than necessary to advance the legislation’s
purpose.185 Furthermore, AB 1541 would have imposed terms on manufacturers
without any similar restrictions on beer distributors.186 In that regard, AB 1541 was
under-inclusive and therefore less extensive than necessary because it only
attempted to prevent manufacturers’ monopolistic activities but not distributors’
monopolistic activities.187 For these reasons, AB 1541 would have failed Central
Hudson’s fourth prong and been unconstitutional.188
Since AB 1541 would have failed intermediate scrutiny, it is unnecessary to
see if the bill could have survived strict scrutiny.189 But it is worth exploring given
Sorrell’s holding that “heightened scrutiny” applies to content-based commercial

184. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473, 482 (2010) (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash.
State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, n. 6) (“[T[his Court recognizes ‘a second type of facial challenge,’
whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional,
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’); SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
OF SB 1957, at 4–5 (Aug. 29, 2000) (identifying an issue with consolidating breweries pressuring small
distributors into unfavorable contracts); Adam Davidson, Are We in Danger of a Beer Monopoly?, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 26, 2017, 3:09 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/magazine/beer-mergers.html (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review); see, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25500.1 (West 2020) (explaining the
importance of maintaining separation of the three tiers to prevent monopoly); see also Legal Near-Monopolies,
CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/legal-near-monopolies
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Near-monopolies are companies that . . . have taken over
a significant portion of the market share. . . . they can virtually be considered monopolies. . . . Examples . . .
Anheuser-Busch: Controls about 45% of the beer market share.”); Carroll, supra note 127; Letter from Bilal K.
Sayyed et al., to Jim Wood, supra note 154.
185. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569–70 (1980) (finding
that a law limiting all electricity advertising to conserve energy without regard for the service’s impact on energy
use was over-inclusive because it suppressed “information about electric devices or services that would cause no
net increase in total energy usage” and the government made no showing that other alternatives would fail to
advance the legislation’s purpose).
186. Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed et al., to Jim Wood, supra note 154.
187. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018) (“[T]he licensed
notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny. . . . If California’s goal is to educate low-income women about
the services it provides, then the licensed notice is ‘wildly underinclusive.’”) (holding that a required notice in
clinics informing pregnant women of publicly-funded family-planning services was under-inclusive and
insufficiently drawn to achieve the asserted purpose and therefore did not survive intermediate scrutiny); Letter
from Bilal K. Sayyed et al., to Jim Wood, supra note 154.
188. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (indicating that the commercial speech restriction in question must
not be “more extensive than is necessary to serve” the substantial interest the government asserts).
189. See Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 850 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (agreeing with
prior precedent that laws governing California beer manufacturer and distributor relationships advance the state’s
substantial interest in having a three-tiered system and are sufficiently tailored to serve that interest); Educ. Media
Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 2013) (“However, like the Court in Sorrell, we need
not determine whether strict scrutiny is applicable here, given that, as detailed below, we too hold that the
challenged regulation fails under intermediate scrutiny set forth in Central Hudson.”); see also United States v.
Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e conclude the government cannot justify a criminal prohibition
of off-label promotion even under Central Hudson’s less rigorous intermediate test.”).

277

2021 / AB 1541 Impacts the Freedom of Speech in Beer Distribution Contracts
speech restrictions that single out one speaker. 190 Similar to the law in Sorrell, AB
1541 targeted manufacturers by compelling contract terms for manufacturers but
not distributors.191 Distributors and other speakers would have had the full freedom
of contract while AB 1541 singled out manufacturers, prohibiting their ability to
contract for no-cause termination or form new contracts.192 Additionally, AB 1541
would have altered the content of brewers’ speech by forcing them to include terms
they do not want to include.193 A law mandating speech from brewers substitutes
freely negotiated speech for the Legislature’s policy preferences. 194 As a result, AB
1541 would have been subject to “heightened scrutiny”—which trends suggest is
strict scrutiny.195
Under strict scrutiny, the government must “narrowly tailor” the law to use the
“least restrictive means” in furtherance of a compelling government interest. 196
The interest in preventing monopoly is not only substantial but also compelling
because American law disfavors monopolies, and the Twenty-First Amendment
permits government regulation of the alcohol industry.197 However, AB 1541 was
not the least restrictive means because it would have burdened small brewers that
cannot possibly acquire a monopoly.198 Instead, the bill was over-inclusive because
it would have treated all manufacturers as threats to the three-tier system, but the
thousands of small craft brewers hardly represent such a threat. 199 AB 1541 was

190. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565–66 (2011).
191. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–64.
192. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted).
193. Id.; see Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (discussing how laws mandating
certain speech both alter speech based on content and compel speech); see also Carroll, supra note 127 (noting
AB 1541 makes it expensive and difficult for brewers to amend or terminate distribution contracts, even when
wholesalers underperform).
194. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted);
cf. Riley, 487 U.S. at 795 (holding that the North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act mandated disclosures from
professional fundraisers because the State claimed an interest in dispelling charity misperceptions); Nordyke v.
Santa Clara Cty., 110 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing how an offer to purchase a firearm is commercial
speech concerning lawful activity, making a prohibition on such offers subject to intermediate scrutiny).
195. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (citing Sorrell as an example of content-based
speech subject to strict scrutiny); Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565–66; Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731
F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding the Central Hudson test is not Sorrell’s “heightened scrutiny”); but see
Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (defining “heightened scrutiny”
as intermediate scrutiny).
196. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994); Sable Comm. of Cal.,
Inc. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
197. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Ser. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 549 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS ASS’N, supra note 171; see A.H. MARTIN & E.E.
MCCLEISH, MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, STATE LIQUOR LEGISLATION 19 (1941) (reasoning that “the right to deal
in intoxicating liquors is not an inherent right, but is subject to the . . . legitimate exercise of [state] police power”
and that many alcohol laws if applied to other industries would be “unconstitutional extension[s] of State
authority” had the liquor industry not been “differentiated from all other occupations” in that it is “placed under
the ban of the law).
198. Carroll, supra note 127; Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed et al., to Jim Wood, supra note 154.
199. See Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2377 (2018) (“The
unlicensed notice imposes a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement . . . to post California’s
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simultaneously under-inclusive in that it would have failed to address the speech
of other speakers in the alcohol industry—like beer distributors and other alcoholic
beverage manufacturers. 200 Such overbreadth and under-inclusivity could have
risked a “chilling [of] protected speech,” as craft brewers could not have negotiated
for no-cause termination or freely terminate distribution contracts later. 201 Existing
beer franchise law does not trap small brewers in distribution contracts
indefinitely, yet it still protects the three-tiered system.202 The prior law and the
alternative below represent other ways to advance this interest without burdening
small brewers, which indicates that AB 1541 was too restrictive. 203 As a result, AB
1541 would have failed strict scrutiny.204
C. An Alternative Approach to Address Beer Distribution Issues
The government cannot avoid compelling speech if it imposes good cause
requirements in beer distribution contracts. 205 However, legislators should re-tool
AB 1541 to avoid unconstitutionally compelling speech through a small brewer
exemption to the good cause provisions.206 Legislators should define “small
brewer” by the annual number of barrels the brewer produces. 207 This exemption
addresses the power imbalance between large manufacturers and distributors,

precise notice, no matter what the facilities say on site or in their advertisements.”) (suggesting that a notice
requirement applied too broadly); see also Gerhart, supra note 26, at 28 (documenting that 6,266 craft brewers
made up about twenty-three percent of total retail sales in 2017).
200. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted);
cf. Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2377–78 (finding the notice requirement unduly
burdened speech by covering “a curiously narrow subset of speakers”).
201. Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2377 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)); AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11,
2019, but not enacted).
202. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.7 (West 2020) (imposing contract terms preventing
brewer termination of beer distribution contracts for failure to meet unreasonable sales goals), with AB 1541,
2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted) (instituting good cause
termination provisions in beer distribution contracts).
203. Carroll, supra note 127; Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed et al., to Jim Wood, supra note 154; see infra
Section IV.C (arguing for an adjustment to AB 1541 exempting small brewers).
204. Cf. Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (finding a
prohibition on indecent commercial telephone services was insufficiently tailored to the compelling interest of
protecting minors).
205. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988) (explaining that the Constitution
protects “what to say and what not to say”).
206. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1) (providing an exemption to mandatory good cause
requirements in distribution agreements for small brewers provided that the brewer pays the distributor fair market
value for the loss of distribution rights prior to termination); see also N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i)
(exempting small brewers from mandatory good cause requirements in distribution contracts so long as the brewer
pays the distributor fair market value for the loss of distribution rights or the prior to termination).
207. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1) (defining “small brewer” as a brewer that produces
fewer than 25,000 barrels of beer a year); see also N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i) (defining “small
brewer” as a brewer that produces fewer than 300,000 barrels of beer a year).
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avoids harming small brewers, and results in a more competitive market.208
This change allows the government to assert its interest in preventing
monopolies without issue.209 Small brewer exemptions advance the government
interest by focusing exclusively on manufacturers that can acquire a monopoly.210
Furthermore, this change is “narrowly tailored” to use the “least restrictive means”
because it does not extend to small brewers outside the government interest’s
scope.211 Unlike AB 1541, this proposal is narrowly drawn to directly advance the
government interest, legitimizing intrusions on large manufacturers’ freedom of
contract.212 This solution is constitutional because it advances the government
interest, is not over-inclusive, and survives strict scrutiny.213
V. CONCLUSION
Because of good cause provisions in beer franchise laws, craft brewers around
the country struggle to make ends meet. 214 AB 1541 would have imposed good
cause restrictions in beer distribution contracts on all manufacturers, even when
the parties freely negotiate no-cause termination.215 These mandated restrictions
would have harmed California’s craft beer industry and would have violated the
First Amendment by unconstitutionally compelling speech.216
However, lawmakers can avoid this constitutional issue by creating a small
brewer exception.217 This exception would please craft brewers and distributors by
208. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1957, at 3–4 (Aug. 29, 2000); Carroll,
supra note 127; Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed, et al., to Jim Wood, supra note 154.
209. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Ser. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 549 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(noting that “monopolies generally are against the public policies of the United States.”).
210. Carroll, supra note 127; cf. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
569 (1980) (discussing how the interest in fair and efficient utility rates had a tenuous link to the state’s advertising
ban, but noting an “immediate connection” between the interest in energy conservation and the advertising ban
which the ban sought to advance).
211. Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 850 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); see Sable Comm.
of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 130 (1989) (discussing how a law cannot be narrowly tailored
if alternatives that advance the interest but do not burden speech as much exist); cf. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at
569–70 (finding that a public utility advertising ban was not more extensive than necessary to advance the interest
in energy conservation because it touched all promotional advertising even if it provided “information about
devices or services that would cause no net increase in total energy consumption” and there was no showing that
“more limited restrictions” would fail to conserve energy).
212. See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923) (stating that the freedom of contract is not
absolute); see also RUANE, supra note 50, at 1 (noting that the government may regulate even the most protected
speech).
213. Cf. Sable Comm., 492 U.S. at 131 (holding a speech regulation was unconstitutional because it was
not the least restrictive means to advance a compelling government interest).
214. Carroll, supra note 127.
215. AB 1541, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as amended on July 11, 2019, but not enacted).
216. Carroll, supra note 127; see Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988) (“There
is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of protected
speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of
speech,’ a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.”).
217. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c)(i); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37A, § 3-111(F)(1).
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protecting distributors from the abuse of massive manufacturers without harming
small craft brewers. 218 This entirely avoids the constitutional issue while allowing
the government to prevent monopolistic behaviors, restore balance to the brewer–
distributor relationship, and keep the craft beer industry healthy. 219 AB 1541 would
have unconstitutionally harmed brewers and the greater craft beer industry. 220 But
with this solution in mind and a better understanding of AB 1541’s constitutional
pitfalls, legislators could continue to keep the craft beer industry healthy. 221

218. See supra Section IV.C.
219. See supra Section IV.C.
220. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796–97 (finding compelled speech unconstitutional as a content-based
regulation); see also Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed et al., to Jim Wood, supra note 154 (explaining that AB 1541
would severely harm the craft beer industry).
221. Letter from Bilal K. Sayyed et al., to Jim Wood, supra note 154; see also supra Section IV.C.
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